International Organisations as Non-State Actors in World Politics
The role of International Organisations is becoming increasingly significant and, sometimes, ultimate for international policy-making, the process coming along with the globalisation of world politics. There are 1,963 IOs in the world today and they deal extensively both with global challenges and countryspecific issues 1 . The number of IOs is constantly growing, as well as their impact on world matters. The major and most significant IOs are those of the UN system, but there are also key intercontinental and regional organisations. It will be true to say that today the independent behaviour of state actors is becoming more limited because of their obligations to international and regional agreements, regimes and institutions. The reality of growing complex interdependence facilitates a structure of global governance, radically challenging state-centric approaches to international policy-making.
One of the major problems associated with the study of IOs in the IR theory is a lack of coherent approach towards the independent behaviour of IOs in global politics; more attention is traditionally given * This article has also been published on http://www.democraticyouth.net/uploads/issues_library/ Transcending_the_State.pdf; its appearance here is its first in a reviewed journal. to their general importance for world affairs and inter-state cooperation, while little attention is given to their policy-making and organisational behaviour, and the transformations they experience because of globalisation and integration processes. As Barnett and Finnemore put it, "…international relations (IR) scholars have not given systematic consideration to how IOs actually behave. Most of our theories are theories of states and state behavior" 2 . Indeed, Realist and Liberal Institutionalist perspectives towards IOs emphasise the importance of states and their rational interests. As Realism suggests, IOs are set up by states, are dependent on them and act for their interests, typically associated with the national security paradigm. "Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour", explains Mearsheimer 3 . The UN Security Council can be normally taken as an example relevant for this approach. Thus, IOs appear as instruments for state interests from this perspective. As Mearsheimer compares, "Institutionalists directly challenge this view of institutions, arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions" 4 . From the perception of Liberal Institutionalists, IOs function as arenas or forums for inter-state policy cooperation. It assumes, of course, that states are not the only important actors in world politics, and that security is not the main issue, and that it is the IOs, along with international regimes and agreements, that help to achieve cooperation among nations. However, Liberal Institutionalism remains statecentric and considers that "…international organizations in the contemporary world are not powerful independent actors, and relatively universal organizations such as the United Nations find it extraordinarily difficult to reach agreement on significant issues" (Keohane, Nye) 5 .
However, though looking at IOs differently, both Realism and Liberal Institutionalism perspectives are based on the understanding of IOs as intergovernmental actors, i.e. actors who cooperate because of shared interests of national governments, thus not being free in their decision-making. The principle of intergovernmentalism suggests that decisionmaking is unanimous and dependent on states, that power is exercised by states, and that the role of international bureaucracy is functional. As Cronin says, "as an intergovernmental institution, the UN reflects the overlapping interests of member states, particularly those of the Security Council. Major initiatives and policies are promoted by accredited delegations, all of whom represent their governments" 6 .
Transnationalism (or transgovernmentalism) is the other principle of IOs' decision-making based on the idea of transcending national interests, on the majority principle, where power is exercised by independent international officials through their own delegated and acquired authority. As Cronin explains, "as a transnational organization, however, the UN also often represents a common good that transcends the sum of individual state interests. Such concerns are promoted by… the UN's specialized agencies, affiliated organizations, bureaucracy and office of the secretary-general" 7 . Transnational decision-making principles are typical for humanitarian and development agencies, international law and human rights organisations (e.g. UNDP, WFP, UNAIDS, ICJ etc.). Cronin claims that there is a tension between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism within the UN, arguing that this conflict "reflects a similar tension within the international system itself" 8 .
If we try to look at policy-making behaviour of IOs, we will be able to see that IOs do act autonomously to a considerable level and that they have quite independent effects on the international system; and that state-centric approaches are not that relevant. As Reinalda and Veerbeek put it, "many international organizations have clearly succeeded in formulating, and sometimes implementing, policies that cannot be described as the simple product of interstate bargaining…" 9 . In contemporary world politics IOs deal not only with such universal challenges as global warming or HIV/AIDS, uniting efforts of states to respond to them, but also with many other issues, which have been considered state matters, and IOs affect interests of states in such areas as healthcare, financial policies, electoral processes or other domestic issues. As Barnett and Finnemore explain, "they make authoritative decisions that reach every corner of the globe and affect areas as public as governmental spending and as private as reproductive rights" 10 .
IOs may act as national administrations, implement governmental tasks and even promote, establish and develop new states (e.g. UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). IOs pose sanctions on states, transform their economies and financial systems, and change their political and institutional landscapes (e.g. UN Security Council, WTO, IMF, UNDP, IBRD, EBRD). It is true that such activities may reflect certain states' interests, but at the same time these activities largely represent IOs' interests, and IOs act as agents of change and socialisation (e.g. Council of Europe, OSCE in Eastern Europe). States may be interested in some level of IOs' autonomy for their goals to be reached, but once created IOs tend to act on their own above the level of functional or operational decisions. As Reinalda and Veerbeek argue, "it appears that sub-national and trans-national organized interests have become influential actors in politics and are noticeably active on their own or by means of collective action through a number of existing and rapidly emerging international organizations" 11 . Even Cox and Jacobson argued in 1973 from a functionalist perspective that IOs staff members either individually or collectively "are usually most influential in operational decisions, but they may also be influential in other types of decisions", and that sometimes they "act quite independently" 12 . However, most importantly, IOs' activities today are substantially of normative origin because IOs create and implement rules, set their own agendas, and construct social norms based on their knowledge and expertise. According to Barnett and Finnemore, IOs use rules "not only to regulate but also to constitute and construct the social world" 13 .
IOs, therefore, act with their own authority, which make them influence world politics autonomously. As Haftel and Thompson put it, "the independence of an institution largely determines its authority and influence -in short, its ability to shape international politics" 14 . Thus, we can consider IOs as bureaucracies with their own logics, norms, and interests, enabling one to look at them as independent non-state actors. As Barnett and Finnemore claim, "the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions" 15 . Abbott and Snidal argue, "IOs can become autonomous sites of authority because their bureaucracies possess legitimate authority and control over expertise" 16 . Since IOs are becoming more influential, they have more authority and, therefore, autonomy. Consequently, if there is a higher level of authority of IOs in world politics today, they enjoy a considerable level of their autonomy.
Thus, the Social Constructivist perspective provides the most adequate and relevant approach towards IOs as non-state autonomous actors in world politics. The role of IOs in international policymaking is growing, as well as their influence. IOs are becoming more independent and act as bureaucracies with their own authority, rules, norms, values and administrative functions, promote the establishment of self-government in Kosovo, facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, coordinate the work of international agencies, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, maintain civil law and order, promote human rights, and assure safe return of refugees back to Kosovo.
UNMIK administers the affairs of Kosovo, dealing with such normally domestic issues as healthcare, education, finance etc. Its operational framework is based on four "pillars": police and justice (UN administered), civil administration (UN administered), democratisation and institution building (OSCE administered), reconstruction and economic development (EU administered) 21 . The Head of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. UNMIK established in Kosovo the Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment: the Assembly, the Government 22 , the Judicial System 23 . NATO provides the international security force (KFOR). Numerous UN agencies have their missions in Kosovo (UNDP, FAO, IMF, WHO etc.). In fact, the UN established a new system of governance for Kosovo, thus making it a new autonomous state-level unit since it has been made "substantially autonomous" 24 from the FRY (now from the Republic of Serbia).
UNMIK consists of bodies, departments and units, and clearly represents an international bureaucracy (with its hierarchy, rules, norms and authority) that governs the region 25 . As Haftel and Thompson indicate, "The existence of a supranational bureaucracy, typically embodied in a secretariat or a commission, is an important sign of 21 Note: Before 2000 there was one more "pillar" for humanitarian assistance administered by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but it was later phased out. IO independence... . We capture variation in supranational bureaucracy independence with two indicators: the existence of a distinct secretariat or its equivalent and the authority of this body to initiate policy" 26 . From this very example, we can see that UNMIK have an extensive bureaucratic structure, which has very large authority for policy initiation. For example, UNMIK started issuing its own travel documents for Kosovo inhabitants, and currently 39 states recognize it 27 . It illustrates a very high level of UNMIK autonomy as a non-state actor. Reinalda and Veerbeek argue that IOs' "degree of autonomy increases strongly when states not only allow certain topics to be put on agendas... but also accept, and participate in, the implementation of such policies" 28 .
The UN is engaged in "state-building" of Kosovo as, in fact, an independent state. Recently, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, presented the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which is to be adopted by the UN Security Council. According to it, "Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law, the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and which promotes the peaceful and prosperous existence of all its inhabitants" 29 . The Proposal suggests that Kosovo should have its own constitution (and defines its principal elements), have its own symbols, be able to enter international organisations, set the model of governance.
The Proposal promotes the establishment of the International Civilian Representative (the EU Special Representative) appointed by the International Steering Group, who will have "supervisory authority" and will be able to "annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction or remove public officials whose actions are determined by the ICR to be inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the 26 Settlement" 30 ; the Proposal grants the ICR with the status of final authority in civil matters, whose mandate will continue till the ISG determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement. The document prescribes that European Security and Defence Policy Mission (ESDP) and International Military Presence (NATO) will also work in Kosovo. The Settlement is supposed to take precedence over all other Kosovo's legal provisions. This initiative is actually a drafted constitution and the creation of a new state out of Serbian sovereignty.
The O SCE Mi ssio n to Bos ni a a nd Herzego vin a
The OSCE has had a mandate for its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) under the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) that was reached in Dayton (Ohio, USA) and later signed in Paris in 1995 to stop the Bosnian War 31 . This document with further sub-agreements mandated OSCE to take responsibility for tasks on elections, human rights, military stabilization and later "democracy-building" 32 .
OSCE has been involved in a broad range of "state-building" activities in BIH. OSCE aims "to encourage the development of democracy by establishing professional and transparent political practices and supporting the growth of democratic government institutions discharging their responsibility effectively in an open and transparent manner" 33 . In this respect, OSCE implements a series of initiatives and projects aimed at public administration reform, building a new governance system. It has organised, conducted and supervised elections, and established the Provisional Election Commission for BIH. OSCE monitors the work of legal and human rights institutions, it has appointed the Human Rights Ombudsman as an international civil servant who reports to the mission. OSCE actually shapes the country's security policy; it is engaged in security monitoring, arms control, and policy coordination with the military of BIH, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro.
The OSCE acts with its own authority, which is gained from the Dayton Agreement, and with its expertise in the field. OSCE, being mandated, enjoys a very high level of autonomy in its policies and tends to expand its mission (for example, the "democracybuilding" task was added in its agenda later after other goals). Debating over the OSCE's elections policy, Cousens and Cater argue, "not only did OSCE mission in Bosnia try use what power it had been given through the Provisional Election Commission, it arguably exercised powers it was never even given, such as when the PEC overruled and EASC decision immediately prior to the 1996 elections. The roles played by OHR and OSCE, particularly when combined with the wide range of international involvement in other arenas of the Bosnian polity and economy, make a heavy 'footprint' indeed of international engagement in the country" 34 . The OSCE Mission in BIH has an extensive international bureaucracy with four departments, regional centres and personnel. OSCE is regulated by its own policy documents and rules; since its tasks are mandated, it then implements them with its own norms and principles.
As "the power to initiate and recommend as an important source of independence" 35 . Thus, OSCE is very autonomous in its policy-making in BIH. Moreover, by these activities OSCE promotes its organisational goals and agendas, enhancing its authority and, consequently, getting more autonomy.
Conclusion
IOs' role and influence in world politics is growing. They produce systemic effects on the international system with their policy-making independent of states' interests, though interests of some states and IOs may overlap. A priori, criticism on IOs' autonomy is mostly based on the assumptions that IOs are intergovernmental in nature and cannot act independently 36 . However, IOs' policy-making behaviour shows that IOs can work transnationally, above the level of inter-state cooperation, and produce independent effects. IOs are enabled by states, but then they tend to act on their own. IOs are international bureaucracies with their internal norms, rules and interests. IOs' policy-making has an essential normative dimension: IOs construct social norms and values, create their agendas and implement policies based on their knowledge and expertise. IOs have their own authority, which make them act autonomously. IOs' autonomous behaviour deals with a broad range of policy areas (trade, finance, health etc.) and they affect interests of states because of their independent policy-making. However, IOs can affect not only interests of states in these areas, but also state system and sovereignty. IOs may construct new norms and values for states, restructure them, and even create new ones. The incorporated examples of UNMIK and OSCE show the very high level of these IOs' autonomy in policymaking and the ability to promote their agendas. IOs' ability to initiate policies and get support for them from states also shows a very high level of their autonomy as non-state actors. I conclude that IOs are to a large extent autonomous in world politics. 35 Yoram Z. Haftel, Alexander Thompson. Op. Cit. -P. 261. 36 There is another dimension of IOs criticism, associated with their legitimacy and accountability as many IOs may be considered as the product of Western civilisation, which makes them undemocratic in nature. However, the focus and the limits of this essay make this discussion principally concentrated on the issues of autonomy. 
